This study¯nds that households do change their consumption expenditures in response to the predictable°uctuations in income induced by the Social Security tax system. A predictable, one-percent increase in after-tax income in a three-month interval contemporaneously increases expenditures on nondurable consumption by around a half of a percent. To put this in perspective, since nondurable consumption averages about 40 percent of income, expenditures on nondurable goods rise 20 cents for each dollar of predictable increase in income. Several steps are taken to reduce the possibility that the results are spurious or that di®erential seasonal patterns of consumption across wealth levels are driving the results. Similar but less statistically signi¯cant results are found among more homogeneous subsamples. Additionally, while not statistically signi¯cant, even larger point estimates are obtained when identi¯cation is derived from the di®erences in behavior between a treatment group of earners who have Social Security taxes withheld from their paychecks and a control group of earners who do not. Finally, motivated by models in which consumption is not smoothed across predictable°u ctuations, the paper examines the consumption response at di®erent levels of assets and for di®erent categories of consumption.
In part, this work provides evidence against consumption smoothing by asking a di®erent question than much of the previous literature. This work asks if households smooth expenditures across three-month periods. Most previous test at the household level use annual data and identify expected income changes from either lower-frequency life-cycle movements or cross-sectional di®erences in income growth. It is possible that consumers smooth expenditures poorly across predictable income°uctuations at threemonth intervals while smoothing expenditures well at lower frequencies. This test also leans more than previous works on high-income individuals who are continuously employed, a group that is less likely than average to be liquidity constrained, but also a group that has a high value for time.
In part, however, this test uncovers evidence against consumption smoothing by improving on most previous household-level tests.
4 It does so in four main ways. First, the income changes caused by Social Security withholding are calculated at the household level and are exogenous to the household. The predicable change in income is thus not highly correlated with labor supply or family size. Such a correlation reduces the power of many previous tests. Second, the predictable changes in income are large and easily identi¯able. Income changes due to the tax cap are around nine percent of net income. Measurement error in the income change is relatively small because the income change is calculated from the level of individual labor income, not its growth rate. Third, the CEX provides comprehensive data on many di®erent types of consumption expenditures at the household level. Many previous microeconomic studies have employed only a (noisy) measure of food consumption. Finally, because this test has a large timeseries dimension (167 three-month periods) and individual-level measures of change in income (including a control group), it avoids the poor performance of tests using short panels with common sources of expected change in income, as critiqued, for example, in Randall P. Mariger and Kathryn Shaw (1993) .
These bene¯ts are shared by some previous studies of consumption smoothing.
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James M. Poterba (1988) , Alec R. Levenson (1996) , and David W. Wilcox (1989) use ¯scal experiments and aggregate consumption data and reach similar conclusions to those of this paper. At the household level, Ronald Bodkin (1959) , Fumio Hayashi (1997) (Chapter 1), and Matthew Shapiro and Joel Slemrod (1995) , Nicholas Souleles (forthcoming), and John Shea (1995) all identify institutional features that deliver signi¯cant, plausibly-exogenous, predictable variations in household income. The¯ndings of these papers also are in general agreement with the¯ndings of the present paper: that there are small but economically-signi¯cant deviations from consumption smoothing. These¯ndings stand in contrast to the literature that employs lagged information to construct measures of predictable income movements, which often fails to reject consumption smoothing (e.g. Orazio Attanasio and Guglielmo Weber (1995)).
I. Consumption Smoothing
Consider a canonical consumption Euler equation:
where E t is the expectations operator; u 0 (:) is a marginal utility function, assumed decreasing; c t is nondurable consumption; z t is a vector of deterministic variables that alter marginal utility through the function º(¢);¯is the discount factor; and R t is the gross after-tax real interest rate between t and t + 1. One can derive a testable relationship from equation (1) by assuming that consumption is approximately lognormally distributed and the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion leading to the linear Euler equation:
where " t+1´l n(c t+1 )¡E t [ln(c t+1 )] and ¾ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
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If expectations are formed rationally and variations in the conditional variance term are unpredictable, then anything known to the household at time t beyond¯R t and
, such as income°uctuations generated by hitting the Social Security tax cap, should not alter the growth rate of consumption in equation (2). Equation (2) highlights the reasons that predictable changes in income might a®ect consumption. First, expectations might not be formed using all available information, so that " t+1 is not uncorrelated with all things known at time t. Second, there might be predictable variations in the conditional variance term (the precautionary saving motive) so that marginal-utility smoothing does not imply consumption smoothing. Finally the Euler equation might not hold for some households, for example due to di±culties in borrowing at R t :
The following speci¯cation is employed to test the linear Euler equation:
where h indexes households; m is a complete set of month dummies; 7 d is a complete set of year dummies less one; z contains a second-order polynomial in family size in the second interview, a second-order polynomial in family size in the¯fth interview, and a fourth-order polynomial in age; and E t h ¢y ss¿ t+1 i is the percent decrease in income due to Social Security taxes. According to the basic LCH/PIH, ® 2 should equal zero. Note that estimating the equation in¯rst di®erences removes any household-speci¯c e®ects in the level of consumption. Further, the regression includes a complete set of month e®ects. Without the month dummies, the seasonal rise in consumption that occurs at the end of the calendar year could incorrectly be attributed to the tax variable, which, on average, falls at the end of the calendar year. Equation (4) then has three sources of variation which identify the e®ect of the changing tax rates on consumption. First, high-income individuals hit the Social Security tax cap and their after-tax income rises in di®erent months depending on each individual's income.
8 Second, for di®erent households, Social Security taxes represent di®erent percentages of after-tax income. For example, a household with two earners in which one earner hits the tax cap undergoes a smaller change in its after-tax income than a household with only one earner in which that earner hits the cap. Finally, there are small changes in the Social Security tax rate across calendar years, which, like the tax caps, are public knowledge well in advance of becoming e®ective.
The residual from equation (4) is serially correlated within households due to time averaging of consumption over three-month periods, measurement error, and possible random e®ects in growth rates. Thus, when estimating equation (4), standard errors are calculated to allow for arbitrary heteroskedastcity and within-household serial correlation.
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II. The Consumer Expenditure Survey
The data used to estimate equation (4) are constructed from the Family, Member, and Detailed Expenditure¯les of the CEX for the years 1980 to 1993. The CEX is a rotating panel of households, with new households entering every month. Data on families and individual members are extracted and merged to make an unbalanced, overlapping panel of households covering January, 1980 to November, 1993 . Each household is interviewed¯ve times. In the¯rst interview, the CEX procedures are explained to the members of the household and they are asked to keep track of their expenditures for future interviews. Each household is subsequently interviewed four more times, once every three months. In each of these interviews, detailed information is collected on the past three months' consumption expenditures. In each family's second and¯fth interviews, demographic and income data is collected, including income and earnings information about the previous 12 months. The CEX reports information on more than 1; 500 households each month, and just over half of households contribute a complete one-year panel of four consumption observations. The crucial independent variable for the test is the percent change in after-tax income caused by°uctuations in Social Security taxes, denoted ¢y ss¿ t+1 : This variable is T ss t ¡ T ss t+1 , the negative¯rst di®erence of the percent of after-tax income paid in Social Security taxes, which in turn is:
where i indexes individuals and r months in an interview period; ¿ h is the average household tax rate; Y i is individual labor income subject to Social Security taxation, Y h is total household pre-tax income; and ¿ ss is the statutory Social Security tax rate in that month. D cap is a variable which equals 1 if the individual has not hit the tax cap, a fraction representing the fraction of the month the individual pays Social Security if the individual hits the tax cap during the month, and 0 otherwise. All variables used to construct ¢y ss¿ t+1 are calculated from retrospective information reported in the second interview, except D cap , which can be, and is, calculated several di®erent ways. First, D cap can be calculated using each measure of individual income that the CEX provides. In addition to the main income datum in the CEX, which is the individual's earnings over the past 12 months, each individual also is asked the amount of his or her last paycheck and the length of the pay period, from which annual income can be calculated. D cap (and thus ¢y ss¿ ) is calculated using both measures of income and the measure used throughout the paper is the average of these two constructs. The second choice one faces is whether to construct D cap ir using the incomes reported in the¯fth interview or those reported in the second.
10 The use of the¯nal interview technically violates the information restriction| that is, one would be using information to calculate a change in income which is not available to the household when it made its initial consumption decisions. Thus, the paper focuses on results that employ solely second-interview information to construct E t h ¢y ss¿ t+1 i and on results that employ secondinterview information to predict (instrument for) a measure of ¢y ss¿ t+1 which uses both the¯fth and second interview reports to construct D cap : Note that this \¯fth interview" measure of the expected change in income is only using¯fth-interview information to calculate when the individual is most likely to have hit the Social Security tax cap.
The¯nal step in constructing E t h ¢y ss¿ t+1 i is to set it to zero for any individual who might not be paying Social Security taxes. This calculation is made on the basis of an individual's employment history, occupation, industry, reported Social Security contributions, and retirement plan payments.
Turning to the construction of the consumption data, the main task of the statistical analysis is to separate the e®ects of di®erential seasonal patterns of consumption from the e®ect of hitting the Social Security tax cap. Since Christmas gift giving is such a seasonal variation, all expenditures on gifts for someone outside the household are excluded from the consumption data. While this helps to minimize the possibility of contamination of the regressions by seasonal factors, if this category belongs in the regressions and is one of the more responsive categories of consumption expenditure, then the omission will bias the coe±cients in favor of the null hypothesis of consumption smoothing. Table 2 presents some summary statistics on the sample. There are 133; 820 observations on 57; 051 households in the sample. 32; 554 households contribute a full three di®erenced observations; 11; 661 contribute only two di®erenced observations; and 12; 836 contribute only one. The appendix discusses additional details of data construction such as the components of nondurable consumption and the dropping of missing, topcoded, extreme, or incomplete observations. Table 3 reports the estimated response of consumption to predictable changes in income (® 2 ) from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of equation (4) on the entire sample using the \¯fth interview" measure of the change in income caused by the Social Security taxes. The response of consumption is highly statistically signi¯cant and implies that when a household's Social Security payments fall so that income rises by 10 percent, nondurable consumption rises by 5:4 percent. Since, as just described, the construction of ; and, to capture some of the nonlinearity in the transformation of income, dummy variables indicating for each measures if it is positive, negative or zero. As reported in the second and third columns of results in the¯rst row of Table 3 , this possible endogeneity is not driving the results.
III. Estimation and Results
The¯rst entry in
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While the¯rst row of Table 3 constitutes a rejection of the linear Euler equation, several steps can still be taken to eliminate possible alternative interpretations. Why might one be concerned with the results so far? First, the¯t of the regressions is small: the R 2 's are just less than one percent. This is due, in part, to the fact that the Social Security tax changes are small relative to the swings in consumption (true movements and those from measurement error). Second, the sample size is very large.
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Under these conditions, only a small spurious correlation between the error term and the independent variable could cause the signi¯cant results. Consider, for example, the following source of such a correlation. Suppose that larger or wealthier families have larger increases in consumption around Christmas and larger incomes and so are more likely to hit the tax cap. Then the change in the Social Security tax variable would be spuriously correlated with the change in consumption through di®erent seasonal preferences for consumption by wealth or family size. Two tacks are taken to reduce this possible spurious correlation.
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First, the analysis is performed on two subsamples: households in which average nondurable consumption exceeds 1; 500 (1987) dollars a month; and households in which either the head or spouse hit the tax cap. These samples are more homogeneous in terms of income and consumption levels, and are smaller by an order of magnitude. They also contain more individuals who hit the tax cap and therefore more variation in expected income changes. The standard deviation of E t h ¢y ss¿ t+1 i in the high consumption subsample is 1:1 percent, and in the cap-hitting subsample, 1:6 percent. These numbers are roughly double and triple that in the entire sample, respectively. The bottom two panels of Table 3 show that similar coe±cients estimates are obtained from these samples while the standard errors increase from those garnered from the full sample.
As a second tack, the response of consumption to expected changes in income is identi¯ed using only the variation across otherwise identical individuals that do and do not pay Social Security taxes. If there is a spurious correlation between consumption growth and E t h ¢y ss¿ t+1 i , such as from di®erential seasonal patterns of consumption, then the correlation will be present for all households regardless of whether they actually have Social Security taxes withheld. Comparing the consumption responses of those individuals know to be covered by Social Security to the responses of a control group of individuals who are not covered by Social Security should eliminate the e®ect of any such spurious correlation.
Using the fact that the Social Security tax withholding rules do not cover the selfemployed, many government workers, and some smaller groups like clergy, each earner in the dataset is assigned to one of three groups: a treatment group comprised of those individuals who almost certainly are subject to Social Security tax withholding; a control group comprised of those individuals who almost certainly are not; and a \neither" group comprised of the remaining individuals. Assignment is made on the basis of¯ve sets of information: an individual's occupation and industry of employment; the amount of Social Security taxes paid by an individual in the past year and whether Social Security or Medicare are usually deducted from his or her paycheck; whether a household overpaid Social Security in the last 12 months; the number of weeks employed in the last year; and¯nally, the household's contributions to a Railroad Retirement pension.
For every household, a hypothetical variable is constructed that represents the change in income due to the Social Security tax rate that that household would have experienced had it been paying Social Security Taxes. This variable is denoted, E t h ¢y ssE t+1 i and its coe±cient captures the e®ect of any spurious correlation, such as the pattern of seasonal.variation discussed above. Similarly, E t h ¢y ssN t+1 i is the hypothetical change for households that are in the \neither" group. The response of interest is then estimated by adding these two variables to the estimating equation:
The signi¯cance of ® 2 again provides a test of the basic LCH/PIH; however the identi¯-cation comes only from the di®erence between the consumption response of the control group and that of the treatment group.
The left panel of Table 4 displays the coe±ceints of interest from estimation of equation (5) on the entire sample. Results are reported for both OLS using the secondinterview measures of expected income change for each group and T SLS estimation. Relative to correlation present in the control group, the reponse of consumption for households in the treatment group is estimated to be one| a much larger estimate than the previous estimate of one half. However, this estimated elasticity of one from the relative response is not statistically di®erent either from the estimate from the absolute response (that is, one half) or from zero. The large standard errors are consistent with the fact that the control group is quite small.
The coe±cient on the hypothetical income change for the entire sample, E t h ¢y ssE h;t+1 i , would be zero if there were no spurious correlation between the constructed measure of expected income change and the residual in equation (5). In fact this coe±cient is negative, suggesting that the spurious correlation is in fact negative, although the estimate is far from statistically signi¯cant. The negative sign is also consistent with the rise in the coe±cient for the treatment group. The coe±cient on the hypothetical income change for the neither group, c ® 3 , lies between the other coe±cients, as it should since it is a mixture of households that actually have Social Security taxes withheld and those that actually do not.
In sum, if it were the case that preference-driven increases in consumption around the end of the calendar year occurred in the same way in which Social Security taxes caused after-tax incomes to rise, then one would expect the point estimates of the relative response of the treatment group to be zero. In fact, consumption responds more for households that are covered by Social Security taxes relative to those that are not. As the right panel of Table 4 shows, estimation on the much smaller subsample of only those households who hit (and would have hit) the Social Security tax cap yields a similar conclusion.
So far, the evidence suggests signi¯cant failures of consumption smoothing. The next section uses the data and test to evaluate two possible explanations for this rejection.
IV. Evidence on Alternative Theories
A. Liquidity Constraints and Precautionary Saving
If the linear Euler equation fails due to liquidity constraints or a correlation between the expected variance of consumption and the growth rate of consumption, then the relationship between expected income growth and consumption growth should be strongest for those households with few liquid assets. In each household's¯fth interview, the CEX collects information on the current level of liquid assets and how this level has changed over the past twelve months. Measures of the value of checking accounts, savings accounts, stock and mutual fund holdings and bonds as of immediately before each household's¯rst consumption observation are constructed. The ratio of this variable to average monthly nondurable consumption yields a measure of how likely a household is to be liquidity constrained or, nearly equivalently, whether consumption is likely to track income due to the changes in the expected variance of consumption.
14 The¯rst two columns of Table 5 report the results of estimation of the linear Euler equation on two di®erent subsets of the data. The¯rst subset includes only households with asset ratios below 1; that is without enough asset wealth to¯nance one month of nondurable consumption. The second subset includes only households with asset ratios above 6: There is little evidence that the Euler equation failure is concentrated among households with the fewest assets. It may well be that since the asset data are retrospective, the signi¯cant amount of noise in the data is correlated in some way with the growth rate of consumption| or with households' increasing or decreasing fortunes{ and it is this aspect of the data that the coe±cients re°ect.
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As another tack, age can be used to proxy for the probability of being liquidity constrained or having few assets. Young households typically have larger expected income growth and fewer assets than do older households. Due to either liquidity constraints or to the optimal choice not to borrow, young households may be more likely to violate the linear Euler equation. The¯nal two columns of Table 5 report a similar pair of regressions to those for the asset classi¯cation but based on a sample of household 43 or younger and a sample of households 44 through 70:
16 While the coe±cients are consistent with the hypothesis that younger households react more to expected changes in income, this di®erence is neither economically nor statistically signi¯cant.
While almost no evidence for liquidity constraints or precautionary savings is found, it should be noted that, since individuals who are not fully employed during the previous 12 months are discarded, the sample has fewer candidates to be liquidity constrained than the population that is typically studied.
B. Near-Rationality
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Consider a model of boundedly-rational consumers who allow consumption to track income provided that this strategy does not take them too far from the utility level that a fully-rational strategy would imply.
18 Thus, households that get a few hundred dollars extra in take-home pay for a few months simply spend some fraction of this money when they get it, rather than completely smoothing consumption expenditures. In this case, one might expect that purchases would track expected income changes more closely for goods with high intertemporal elasticities of substitution of expenditures| that is, for which swings in consumption expenditure provide little utility loss. The more a good is durable or storable, or provides lasting utility, the higher the e®ective intertemporal substitutability of such a good. For example, relative to the swing in expenditures, there is a small gain in utility for a household which takes its monthly trip to the movies a week early. Buying lunch a few hours later may cause a large utility loss. Table 6 displays the results of estimating the response of expenditures for di®er-ent categories of goods. The elasticity of total expenditures to expected changes in take-home pay is estimated as similar to that of nondurables. This¯nding suggests that nondurable and durable expenditures react similarly to predicable changes in income.
19 Consistent with this version of near rationality, food consumption (Table 6 , column 2) responds less than nondurable consumption to expected changes in income, while expenditures on entertainment and personal care, which also includes expenditures on reading materials and tobacco and smoking supplies, shows a slightly stronger reaction in the entire sample, and no response in the subsample of households in which one member hits the Social Security tax cap. Finally, apparel and services consumption reacts the most of all categories, with point estimates of 1 to 2. Since expenditures on apparel and services make up roughly 5:6 percent of after-tax income, this estimate suggests that for every extra expected dollar of income which a Social Security tax change induces, 6 to 12 cents are spent on apparel and services.
Two¯nal points about this alternative hypothesis are worth mentioning. First, this test of consumption smoothing leans most heavily on high-income households who are likely to have the highest dollar value of time. If optimizing takes time, such households are more likely than the typical household to imperfectly smooth consumption over these tax-induced swings in income. Second, the low¯t of the regression suggests that the Social Security tax code does not cause most°uctuations in consumption. Thus there would not be a large percentage reduction in the variance of consumption if households did completely smooth consumption across Social Security tax changes.
V. Conclusion
Consumers do not perfectly smooth their demand for goods at quarterly frequencies across expected income changes. Contrary to the basic LCH/PIH, consumption reacts in an economically signi¯cant manner to predictable changes in tax rates: the elasticity of expenditures on nondurable goods with respect to the predictable declines in income that are studied is around one half. Consistent with some stories of bounded rationality, the strongest violations of consumption smoothing occur in subcategories of consumption in which households can easily substitute purchases across time. No evidence is found that precautionary saving or a constraint on borrowing is causing the failure of consumption smoothing. This paper tests the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and the basic LCH/PIH. Consumer behavior may be in accord with the basic LCH/PIH but expectations may not be formed as predicted by rational expectations theory. That is, some subset of households may face constraints on time which make it optimal for them to ignore the complex Social Security tax code when forming expectations about their future income. In this case, consumption for these households rises because the analyzed changes in after-tax income come as a surprise. Note, however, that if this theory is to rationalize the magnitude of the point estimate, households must expect the income shock caused by hitting the tax cap to be more persistent than it actually is. This paper and other recent evidence against pure consumption smoothing have potentially far-reaching implications. If expected changes in taxes in°uence contemporaneous consumption behavior, then¯scal stabilization, such as that undertaken by President Bush in 1992 or that provided by automatic tax stabilizers, is likely to have important e®ects on consumption. While one must keep in mind that the current experiment is a partial-equilibrium result and involves small swings in income, the¯ndings of this paper suggest that when studying horizons such as those addressed in business cycle models, the linear Euler equation is not a close approximation to the correct structural equation.
The CEX family, member and detailed expenditure¯les for years 1980 to 1993 were provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Most information about the CEX was obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics (1980 Statistics ( -1993 and conversations with statisticians at Division of the CEX in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Any family that is missing the second interview reports of family size or age of reference person is dropped. Households also are dropped if before-tax household income or after-tax household income in the second interview is topcoded, incomplete or missing. Age is the average of both head and spouse if there is a spouse, otherwise it is the head's. Due to some extreme reports, reported tax rates above 60 percent are reset to 60 percent, and those below 0 to 0. The results are quite insensitive to alternatives to this correction. Households should not be matched across 1985 to 1986, and are not.
Consumption data are compiled from the detailed expenditure¯les. Monthly expenditures are averaged over the number of months with nonzero nondurable consumption to get consumption at a quarterly rate except total expenditures which are averaged over the number of months with positive total expenditures. Any three-month period with only one month of expenditures is dropped. Households with nondurable consumption less than 1; 000 1987 dollars are dropped.
Nondurable consumption is the sum of expenditures on the following categories of goods: food, excluding food as pay and school meals; alcohol; house furnishings and equipment, excluding furniture, major appliances, and°oor coverings; apparel and services; transportation, excluding new and used vehicle spending and¯nancing; entertainment; personal care; reading; and tobacco and smoking. Total consumption is de¯ned as total expenditures less outlays for mortgage payments, education, health care, pensions, and cash contributions. Food expenditures are all expenditures on food and alcohol less food as pay and school meals. Entertainment and Personal Care is the sum of Entertainment, Personal Care, Reading, and Tobacco and Smoking expenditures. Nondurable consumption observations which have changes in consumption across 3-month periods in excess of 100 percent are dropped.
The measure of income using¯fth-interview information is constructed by extrapolating using the second and¯fth interview reports. If income changes by more than 25 percent between the second and¯fth reports, the¯fth measure is used. Assets are considered missing if both savings and checking account information is missing. When this account information is not missing, bonds and stock accounts are added to the amounts in the accounts to create total asset measures.
Individuals are assigned to treatment, control and neither groups as follows. Individuals who are Federal government employees prior to 1984 or self-employed are assigned to the control group. All individuals who are not Federal government employees prior to 1984 and who are government employees are placed in a government category. All individuals in any family that reports paying into a government retirement account and that has no members already assigned to the government group are moved into the government group. Next any individual who reports paying Social Security in his or her normal paycheck or during the last 12 months is assigned to the treatment group. Those who report not paying Social Security in either of these questions are put into the control group. The remaining government workers are placed in the neither group. Next, any individual who is missing industry or occupation data is put into the treatment group unless they report not paying Social Security taxes. Any individual who reports overpaying Social Security (which generally occurs only because individuals switch jobs) or working less than 50 weeks during the past year is placed into the neither group. If a family reports paying into a Railroad Retirement (RRR) account and both adults work, the household is moved into the neither group. If a household reporting paying RRR consists of only one worker, or if the other worker is already assigned to the treatment group, the individual is put into the control group pre-1985 and into the treatment group from 1985 onwards. At the end of the procedure, any individual assigned to both the treatment and the control group is moved into the neither group. Individuals without labor income are not assigned to any group.
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1. As subsequently discussed, the theory predicts smoothing of marginal utility which does not generally imply smoothing of consumption. Here, the basic LCH/PIH is used to refer to the versions of the theory that imply consumption smoothing, as in the certainty-equivalent version originally employed by Robert E. Hall (1978) , and a version which assumes constant expected variance of consumption, as discussed in section I. Consumption smoothing is also consistent with both Franco Modigliani and Richard Brumberg (1956) and Milton Friedman (1957) although they did not impose rational expectations.
2. The author is indebted to Joel Slemrod for suggesting the Social Security tax cap as a means of testing consumption smoothing.
3. Beginning in 1982, the maximum contribution is adjusted upward automatically based on the average annual percent wage change and then rounded to the nearest gure divisible by $300. From 1990 to 1992 the rate of increase is accelerated because previous adjustments ignored non-wage and deferred compensation which had been growing more rapidly than wage compensation. 6. The parameter ¾ is also one over the coe±cient of relative risk aversion. The same substantive implications also can be derived from a Taylor approximation to equation (1) for a general utility function, as in Karen Dynan (1993).
7. Since individual observations are actually overlapping three-month periods, each \month" dummy represents a three-month period.
8. As shown in Table 1 , after 1992, an individual can hit two caps at a di®erent times during a year because the tax caps for OASDI and HI di®er.
9. Let X h;t represent the row vector of regressors for household h in period t and X h represent the X h;t vectors vertically stacked. The variance-covariance matrix is estimated as (
¡1 where e h is the column vector of residuals for household h from estimation of equation (4). For twostage least squares regressions, the same formula is employed with X h replaced by
where k indexes the regressors and the columns of b°, and Z h is the matrix of exogenous instruments. In practice, the¯rst-order intra-household serial correlation is ¡0:4 while higher orders are insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero.
10. The correlation between the measures from the same interview is 0:75: The correlation between the averages from di®erent interviews is 0:90. The two measures from the same interview are entered separately when used as instruments, as subsequently discussed.
11. The following alternative speci¯cations are examined and found not to eliminate the statistical or substantive signi¯cance of the¯nding in the¯rst row of Table  3 : feasible generalized least squares estimation, a complete set of time dummies rather than month and year dummies, not dropping outliers, including gift expenditures for people outside the household, and various measures of y ss¿ which are not averages of measures. Analysis in levels (rather than percents) uncovers even greater statistical signi¯cance, but smaller economic e®ects. Finally, even the income measure taken from the second interview includes some information not available to the household when it made its consumption decisions at the beginning of the three-month recall period of the second interview. Dropping all changes in consumption from interview 2; both OLS estimation using only interview two information and TSLS estimation consistently yield coe±cients of around or above 0:5: 12. Actually, only about thirteen percent of the sample have nonzero ¢¿ ss .
13. A third and fourth tack are also tried. As suggested by Christina H. Paxson, since all gifts to members outside the household are excluded, by restricting the sample to households of size one, all gifts can be eliminated from consumption. Doing so yields coe±cients greater than one which, while much less precisely estimated, remain statistically di®erent from zero. As suggested by a referee, one can drop observations in which one member of a household hits the Social Security tax cap late in the year, when seasonal spending causes the largest°uctuations in consumption. Using the average of the second interview reports of income to construct the tax-induced change in income uncovers an elasticity of 0:502 with a standard error of 0:207 when dropping any household in which either member hits the cap in November or December. A slightly higher elasticity of 0:535 with a standard error of 0:225 is found when dropping any household in which either member hits the cap in October, November or December.
14. See Christopher D. Carroll (1997) and Deaton (1992) for discussions of the relationship between liquidity constraints and precautionary saving.
15. Interacting the ratio itself or picking a single cuto® near the middle of the distribution leads to similar inconclusions. , et al. (1996) ¯nd that age is a signi¯cant predictor of whether a household reports that it is liquidity constrained and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Parker (1997) estimate that the typical household moves from \bu®er-stock" type behavior to behavior more consistent with that of the basic LCH/PIH around age 43.
Tulio Japelli
17. The idea of these \rules of thumb" is similar in spirit to those proposed by Hall and Frederic S. Mishkin (1982) .
18. Here \boundedly rational" and \fully-rational" apply to the behavior interpreted within the context of the model of Section I. That is, boundedly rational behavior is not meant to imply that the behavior is not perfectly rational within the context of a more detailed model in which the constraints on calculation, information gathering, or time are made explicit. An interesting and relevant test is found in Paxson (1992) which¯nds that Thai farmers |a group likely to have large costs associated with letting consumption track income | smooth their consumption quite well over predicable seasonal variations in harvests.
19. The Social Security tax changes are known far enough in advance that this is a valid test when expenditures on durable goods are added to nondurable expenditures as studied in N. Gregory Mankiw (1992) and Ricardo J. Caballero (1993). Notes: The dependent variable is change in the log of nondurable consumption excluding gifts to those outside the household. In addition to the measure of the change in income caused by the Social Security tax, all regressions also include a fourth-order polynomial in age, a second-order polynomial in family size in the second interview and in the last interview, and complete sets (less one) of month and year dummies. The instrument set includes all these additional regressors and both measures of the income change due to the Social Security tax calculated from second interview information, and dummy variables for whether the changes thus calculated are strictly positive for that observation and dummy variables for whether the changes are strictly negative. The dependent variable is change in the log of nondurable consumption excluding gifts to those outside the household. In addition to the measure of the change in income caused by the Social Security tax, all regressions also include a constant, fourth-order polynomial in age, a second-order polynomial in family size in the second interview and in the last interview, and complete sets (less one) of month and year dummies. The instrument set includes all these additional regressors and both measures of the income change due to the Social Security tax calculated from second interview information, and dummy variables for whether the changes thus calculated are strictly positive for that observation and dummy variables for whether the changes are strictly negative. The percentages reported are the number of heads or spouses with positive earnings in each group divided by the total number of heads and spouses with positive earnings. The dependent variable is change in the log of nondurable consumption excluding gifts to those outside the household. High age is 44 to 70; low age is 43 or younger. High asset ratio is more than enough assets to¯nance 6 months of nondurable consumption; low asset ratio is less than enough assets to¯nance one month of nondurable consumption; the remaining households are dropped. All regressions employ TSLS on the¯fth interview ¢y ss¿ : In addition to the¯fth interview measure of the change in income caused by the Social Security tax all regressions also include a constant, a fourth-order polynomial in age, a second-order polynomial in family size in the second interview and in the last interview, and complete sets (less one) of month and year dummies. The instrument set replaces the Social Security variable with the following variables: both measures of the income change due to the Social Security tax calculated from second interview information, and dummy variables for whether the changes thus calculated are strictly positive for that observation and dummy variables for whether the changes are strictly negative. Note: In regressions on total and food consumption observations are discarded if consumption changes more than 100 percent between quarters. For the other categories, the cuto® is 200 percent. These cuto®s are all around two standard deviations. See the appendix for exact de¯nitions of the categories. All regressions employ TSLS on the¯fth interview ¢y ss¿ : In addition to the¯fth interview measure of the change in income caused by the Social Security tax all regressions also include a constant, a fourth-order polynomial in age, a second-order polynomial in family size in the second interview and in the last interview, and complete sets (less one) of month and year dummies. The instrument set replaces the Social Security variable with the following variables: both measures of the income change due to the Social Security tax calculated from second interview information, and dummy variables for whether the changes thus calculated are strictly positive for that observation and dummy variables for whether the changes are strictly negative.
